MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: H-34 Helicopters for the VNAF 219th
Squadron (S)
1. On 27 September 1966, you approved the transfer
of 39 Navy Ready Reserve H-34 helicopters to the VNAF on the
basis that no reduction in Reserve force levels would be
required. The 219th Squadron, which exclusively supports
MACSOG's out-of-country operations, received 18 of these
helicopters, with the remaining 21 assigned to the four VNAF
Corps squadrons .
2. On 25 September 196 7, COMUSMACV stated that the
219th Squadron had 14 of their authorized 25 H-34 helicopters.
This critical shortage of 11 helicopters can be expected to
increase due to expansions of cross-border operations. These
11 plus projected attrition of 21 helicopters, computed at 1.4
per month loss rate for 15 months , result in a total require-
ment for 32 helicopters.
a U H Q
3. (1BP> On 6 October 196 7, CINCPAC requested that the critical
shortage of helicopters in the 219th Squadron be alleviated by:
a. Providing additional H-34 helicopters from sources
outside Vietnam to bring the 219th Squadron to authorized
strength and to maintain that strength through January 1969,
at which time the 219th Squadron could be augmented through
lateral transfer of CH-34s from the other four VNAF squadrons
as they in turn received UH-1 deliveries scheduled to begin
in mid-1968.
b. Realigning relative priorities for nine UH-1 heli-
copters, currently programmed for delivery to the VNAF in
June 196 8, for expedited delivery beginning 1 December 1967.
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4. (^[^ Expedited UH-1 delivery was considered and rejected
due to higher US priorities, increasing US needs, and decreasing
production.
5. (flMr Internal reallocation of VNAF resources without
diversion of UH-1 deliveries is not practical because of H-34
shortages already existing in the four VNAF squadrons supporting
in-country operations. COMUSMACV desires to increase this VNAF
helicopter lift capability to improve Vietnamese combat effective-
ness.
6. (IW^The transfer of H-34s from sources outside Vietnam
is required but can be accomplished only at the detriment of
Service readiness. In the Army instance, the withdrawal of
helicopters from USAREUR would reduce significantly essential
helicopter combat logistical and troop-lift capability. The
same withdrawal from CX)NUS (excluding the aviation training base)
would result in almost total loss of helicopter medical evacuation
capability at training centers or serious reduction in H-34
training essential to REFORGER units in CONUS. In the Marine
Corps instance, any transfer of UH-34s to the VNAF would increase
the shortage of medium helicopter lift capability in the Active
forces. The 4th Marine Expeditionary Force (Reserve) is authorized
during FY 1969 a total of 120 UH-34s. An additional result of
a transfer would be to delay further the attainment of this force
level .
7. (IHNb The principal sources of available H-34s are active
Army and Navy /Marine Ready Reserve assets . A summary of the
assets relating to the transfer of the 32 H-34 helicopters is
contained in the table in Appendix A hereto. The discussion
of alternatives is contained in Appendix B hereto.
8. (MMr The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the require-
ment for 32 additional helicopters for the VNAF 219th Squadron
during the next 12 months is valid. Further, they consider
that Reserve assets should normally be utilized to fill the
219th Squadron requirement rather than drawing from Active
forces. However, since time is limited in providing helicopters
to the 219th Squadron, they recommend that 32 H-34s be provided
to the 219th Squadron by:
a. The immediate transfer of 16 H-34s from Army resources.
b. The transfer of 16 Marine H-34s during May 1968.
2
^ it ''^ ^
9, 4t0 The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that production
limitations have resulted in a worldwide helicopter shortage
and have initiated an examination of overall helicopter
production. The results of this study will be forwarded with
their recommendations to you upon completion*
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
EARLE G, WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Attachments
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-Appendix A
9
APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION OP ALTERNATIVES
BACKGROUND
1. During most of 19'66, the critical shortage of VNAP 1
helicopters in Vietnam was handled as a FLAGPOLE item. 2
This shortage was examined in JCSM-402-66 and JCSM- 3
i486-66. 4
2. The product of this survey was a recommendation 5
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of 6
Defense to transfer 39 helicopters from US assets to 7
the RVN. It was recommended that these be drawn from US 8
Army, Europe, or, as a less desirable military alternative, 9
from Navy Ready Reserve Forces. 10
3. T?) The naval alternative was approved on 27 September 11
1966 by Secretary of Defense memorandum 61^2 on the 12
basis that no reduction in Reserve force levels would 13
be required. The transfer was completed between Ik
January and July 1967. The 39 helicopters were assigned 15
as follows: 21 to U VNAF Corps squadrons (in-country 16
operations) and I8 to the 219th VNAF Squadron. 17
i^. The 18 H-3^s assigned to the 219th Squadron were iQ
reduced to l4 by 6 October 196? as a result of combat losses. 19
Thus, a shortfall of 11 aircraft existed between the 20
presently authorized figure of 25 and the 6 October 196? 21
figure of V\ assigned. In addition, the 219th Squadron had 22
an average of 70 percent "operationally ready rate" which 23
resulted in an average of 10 helicopters operational 24
at that time. pc
Appendix B
9 4 1 i 0 3 'J''^f
TOP SEq
PRESENT SITUATION
5. IMI This helicopter shortage severely limits the 219th 1
Squadron* s capability to meet its growing mission load and has 2
limited the use of exploitation (HORNET) forces in 3
PRAIRIE FIRE operations at a time when their need and use 4
are increasing. This shortage requires that the 2l9th Squadron 5
be augmented on a mission basis by US helicopters flown by 6
US pilots, thus reducing the US helicopters available 7
for in-country missions. 8
6. The aircraft shortage in the 219th Squadron, coupled 9
with the aircrew surplus, means that experienced Vietnamese 10
pilots must rotate missions and thus cannot make a full con- 11
tribution to the war effort. 12
7. (*^g# There are two general approaches to relieving the 13
H-34 shortage in the 219th Squadron. The first is by an 14
internal reallocation of VNAF resources. I5
a. could be transferred from the four other- VNAP 16
H-34 squadrons to the 219th Squadron. However, these units 17
are themselves short of aircraft, and it is an objective 18
of COMUSMACV to upgrade their capability to support the 19
Vietnamese ground forces' in-country operations. 20
b. H-34s could be transferred from the other VNAF 21
squadrons and replaced with UH-ls. However, other 22
Pl'lorlty co.upetltloii j'or Uil-1 production and specific 23
configuration requirements of VNAF UH-ls, if ordered, 24
preclude expedited delivery of UH-ls for the VNAF. In 25
addition, VNAF pilots are not yet trained in UH-ls. 26
They are scheduled to be trained and on hand as Uli-ls 27
are made available to the VNAF. The current VNAF UH-1 28
delivery schedule, which experience has shown is ^9
subject to slippage, calls for nine helicopters to be 30
delivered between June 1968 and January I969. Because of 31
Appendix R
past actions, the acceleration of UH-1 deliveries 1
to US forces has been maximized. Henc^ there is 2
little possibility that the delivery schedule of 3
UH-ls to the VNAP can be accelerated and may well be 4
considerably delayed in favor of US deliveries. 5
8. The second way to relieve the H-34 shortage in 6
the 219th Squadron is to transfer H~34s from an out-of- 7
country source. The Active Army and the Navy /Marine 8
Ready Reserve forces are the principal sources of H-34s. 9
a. The CH-34 helicopter is a substitute for the 10
UH-1^ which is the Army's primary utility helicopter. 11
Priority of assignment is RVN, units for RVN,and the 12
aviation training base. The USAREUR utility helicopter 13
inventory meets only minimum training requirements. 14
Except for 2 in USARSO, all 280 US Army assets 15
are in Europe or CONUS . 16
(1) USAREUR. The current helicopter fleet is 17
jar-1:/ :^ufficient to meet airmobile training 18
requirements or to support short-term combat I9
operations. USAREUR is authorized 402 UH-1 20
helicopters and has 106 assigned ahd 212 H-.34 21
substitutes. This is a total of 318 helicopters, or 22
a shortage of 84 helicopters. USAREUR also possesses 23
117 U-6 (fixed-wing) aircraft which have been 24
designated by OSD as helicopter substitutes. The 25
CH-34 is essential to USAREUR »s combat logistical 26
and troop-lift capability. Loss of additional 27
helicopters would result in further decrease of 28
combat effectiveness. Since 1 January I967, USAREUR 29
aviation assets have been reduced by a total of 10 30
U-6s and 16 CH-34s. The CH-34s are now in CONUS. 31
(2) COIvRJS. The Active Army (CONUS), less aviation 32
training base, is authorized 7^^9 UII-l helicopters 33
and has 103 assigned and 36 CK-3^ substitutes. 34
aMaMMMtt^^ENS ITIVE
^^^^^^^^^^MBBB^ ^ Appendix B
9 41103--^'"/^
CH-3^ helicopters are essential for CONUS -based 1
REFORGER units. REFORGER units, when redeployed to 2
Europe J will be equipped in Europe with CH-S^ 3
helicopters. CONUS CH-3^ helicopters are required 4
to support pilot proficiency, to provide logistical 5
and lift support for training, and to maintain 6
troop familiarity with the aircraft. Eight CH-34s 7
have been earmarked against REFORGER unit 8
requirements. Four provide VIP transportation in 9
Washington and 1^ provide med-evac capability at 10
training centers, replacing helicopter medical 11
detachments which have been deployed to RVN. In 12
five of these centers, this is the only form of 13
helicopter support. l4
(a) The training base is authorized 66l 15
UH-1 and 34 CH-34 helicopters and has 652 UH-ls I6
and 32 CH-34s assigned. These CH-34 helicopters 17
are essential for the training of maintenance 18
personnel and VNAF aviators. 19
(b.) The Army Re serve /National Guard have a TO&E 20
authorization of 1,0^1^ UH-1 helicopters, to be 21
provided as far as possible from resources 22
available upon termination of the conflict in 23
SEAsia, and have no UH-1 or substitute H-34s 24
assigned. This requires the use of Active Army 25
helicopters during periods of civil disturbance 26
and Reserve annual training. Thus, the Active Army's 27
combat effectiveness is reduced during and 28
following periods of Reserve support. 29
b. The current Naval Reserve SH-34J ASW helicopter 30
inventory is barely sufficient to support ASW 31
proficiency requirements of Naval Reserve forces. 32
The Navy is authorized 56 SH-34J helicopters for 33
Ready Reserve ASW helicopter squadrons. They presently 34
941
TOP SEi
have 57 SH-34J aircraft assigned. Drawdown of these 1
limited assets would have a detrimental impact on Navy/ 2
Marine Corps capabilities because: 3
(1) The Navy Ready Reserve helicopter squadrons 4
constitute a strategic reserve capability for 5
Navy ASW forces. 6
(2) The Navy Reserve helicopters provide the 7
sole source of equipment for maintaining ASW 8
proficiency for 326 Navy Reserve ASW helicopter 9
pilots and their 210 associated Naval Reserve ASW 10
helicopter teams. The United States requires 24 months 11
to train an ASW helicopter pilot at a cost of $176,000. 12
The Naval Reserve ASW helicopters also constitute the 13
primary source of proficiency flying equipment for l4
200 Marine Reserve helicopter pilots. 1:5
(3) The specially configured SH-34 ASW helicopter 16
cannot be replaced from programmed production. I7
There are no H-34 production lines, and the last I8
SH-5 production line will close in December 1968. 19
(4) There will be a Navy Ready Reserve shortfall 20
of four SH-34 aircraft by the end of FY I968. Further, 21
there will be an over-all Navy /Marine Ready Reserve 22
shortfall of 65 H-34s by the end of FY I968. 23
(5) A further requirement for the SH-34s may 24
develop because of the present problems associated 2 5
with the Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter. Since May 26
1967, the CH-46 has had nine catastrophic failures. 2 7
The most recent failure of a CH-46 (an improved .28
D model) occurred on 8 January 1968. There are 29
rive CH-46 squadrons (120 aircraft) presently 30
deployed to SEAsia. If its structural deficiencies -^,1
are not resolved, the CH-46 will have to undergo 32
Appendix B
an extensive rework program. It would then be necessary 1
to provide replacement helicopters to support Marine 2
operations in SEAsla. 3
9. (fj^the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that Reserve 4
assets should normally be utilized to fill the VNAP 219th Squadron 5
requirement rather than drawing down Active forces;. However, 6
previous experience In the transfer of helicopters to the VNAP from 7
the Navy Ready Reserve has indicated a reconfiguration and 8
overhaul time of approximately six months for aircraft obtained 9
from this source. Since time Is limited in providing aircraft 10
to the VNAP 219th Squadron, the Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore 11
recommend that : 12
a. The Active Army immediately provide 16 H-^S'ts 13
to the VNAP 219th Squadron/ m
b. Sixteen Marine H-3^s be transferred to the VNAP 219th 15
Squadron during May 1968. 16
Appendix B
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